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NOTES AND COMMENT
Constitutional Law: Excessive assessment for pavement not
taking property without due process.-Where the owner of lots
abutting on a street has failed to take due advantage of his statutory
remedies in connection with a special excessive assessment, it has been
held in Lytle v. Sioux City, et al (Iowa 1924), 200 N. W. 416, that the
enforcement of such assessment by the city council is not a taking of
property without the process of law.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides: "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law." As is clearly indicated by its very
language, this amendment constitutes a limitation merely on the powers
of the state and its agents. It adds nothing to the rights of a citizen
as against another, but simply furnishes a guaranty against any en-
croachment by the state on those fundamental rights which inherently
belong to every citizen.
"Due process" has been defined by Judge Cooley as "such an exertion
of the powers of government as the settled maxims of law permit and
sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual
rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the one
in question belongs."
To what principles, then, are we to resort to ascertain whether the
action by a city council is due process? In answering this question, we
must first examine the Constitution itself, to see whether any of its pro-
visions have been violated, and then look to the settled modes and prin-
ciples of proceedings existing under the common and statute law.
The case under discussion clearly avoids any direct conflict with the
Constitution itself. Hence, we must look to the principles of the
common law and to the statutes for enlightment. It has been held that
"state statutes enacted in pursuance of the police power, for the pro-
motion of the general welfare, may impose reasonable restrictions on the
use and control of private property without violating the guarantees of
due process."' The statutes of Iowa (Section 824) provide that: "All
objections to errors, irregularities or inequalities in the making of special
assessments, or in any of the prior proceedings or notices, not made
before the city council at the time and manner provided for, shall be
waived except in cases where fraud is shown." Under this section the
appellant had every opportunity of contesting his assessment but failed
to take advantage of it. Had he, as provided by this statute, properly
objected, or had he prosecuted an appeal to the district court, it cannot
be doubted but that he would have received the relief to which he was
entitled. His failure constituted a waiver as has been repeatedly held.
"Where the question raised does not relate to the jurisdiction of the
council to make the assessment, but merely to the exercise of the power,
in the absence of fraud, the statutory remedy is conclusive.",2
'Latimer v. McNeal, 142 Fed. 451.
Ling Su Fan v. U. S., 218 U. S. 302.
179 Iowa 882; 162 N. W. 212.
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Appellant might contend that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin holds
contra but a careful analysis of the cases shows that this is a mistake.
The Wisconsin court says: "Where special assessments for public im-
provements are involved, the remedy by appeal is not exclusive." It
may be well to note, however, in passing, that this rule as announced by
the Wisconsin court has been reluctantly followed in obedience to the
doctrine of stare decisis. Certainly it is not necessary to involve the
doctrine of estoppel for when the appellant failed to raise his objection,
he waived all collateral rights thereto." 3
The legality of the assessment cannot now be impeached on the
grounds that the benefits are not immediately reflected in the present
market value of the premises. The lots abutted on the street, as the
facts clearly show. Consequently, the "owner cannot logically contend
that there has not been any material benefits through this improve-
ment." 4
The nation has many cities in which this form of development is
constantly going on. Through this method property is transformed
from its native state and made more desirable for the erection of homes
and factories. Our large cities of today are testimony of the beneficial
changes that have been going on. True, the nature of the improvements
renders it impossible to exact the precise value that has thereby re-
sulted, yet such uncertainty gives no cause for valid objections. Some
property, by its natural state, is necessarily assesed at a figure that is
more than its actual value, yet a conclusion that the assessment is there-
fore void does not follow. "Property that was worthless before may,
by such improvement, become greatly enhanced." 5
We therefore conclude that the property was materially benefited;
that it was thereby subjected to an assessment and that as the owner had
been given the right to statutory objections, he was given due process.
His failure estops him from being heard in the matter and prevents
him from legally saying that he had been denied fundamental rights
under the "laws of the land."6
ALFRED E. LA FRANCE.
Sales: Manufacturers and Dealers impliedly warrant food prod-
ucts free from poison: Flour Manufacturers. liability fort death of
customer of retailer from poison in flour. The plaintiff in the case
of Hertzler v. Manshunm, et al, (Mich. 1924), 2oo N. W. I55, sued for
damages for the death of her husband which was brought about by
arsenic poison contained in flour which was used for bread of which
the deceased partook. The flour was manufactured by one of the de-
fendants and sold to plaintiff by the other defendant, who was a grocer.
The court held that the presence of poison in the flour was prima facie
evidence of negligence and that the manufacturer was liable to the
ultimate consumer for breach of implied warranty for food stuffs
'Kersten v. City of Milwaukee, io9 Wis. 20o; 81 N. W. 948.
'Camp v. City of Davenport, 151 Ia. 38; 13o N. W. 137.
'In re Paving Floyd Park, 196 N. W. 5o7.
'School District Board of Education v. Blodgett, 155 Ill. 441; 4o N. E. 1O25.
